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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
necessities furnished to the mother, since mere proof of an unborn child's
existence shows necessity for food, clothing and shelter. Accordingly the
failure of the father to furnish such necessities to the mother is a direct
violation of the above statute, since it is manifest that, if the mother were
without food, clothing or shelter, her health would be impaired and if carried to the extreme, death would result and such impairment of the health
of the mother would also impair the health of the child. Therefore it can
be only concluded that necessities furnished to the mother are also furnished the unborn child. Chandler v. State4 5 graphically states the liberal
viewpoint in saying that a child is a helpless infant, deriving its sustenance from its mother's breast, and if the baby procures its food from
its mother's breast, then the duty devolves upon the father to furnish sustenance for the support of the mother, that she may in turn in the course
of nature, be able to furnish the child with its nourishment. If we are to
follow precedent and the strict construction of the bastardy statutes, then
the decision in the instant case is the desired one, but if the welfare of
the child is to be considered, the liberal tendency, as set forth in the foreJ. H. H.
going statutes and cases, should be followed.
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Tennessee placed a tax on gasoline purchased by Appellant outside the
State and stored within it pending use in Appellant's business as an interstate rail carrier. Appellant brought suit in a Tennessee Chancery Court,
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, to have the tax act declared
unconstitutional under the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Tennessee court upheld the act; Appellant appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which pointed out that before it cauld have
jurisdiction, under Article III, Sec. 2, of the Federal Constitution, a case
or controversy must be presented. Held, in determining this question, the
court looks to the nature of the proceeding which the statute authorizes,
and the effect of the judgment rendered upon the rights which Appellant
asserts. That Appellant, whose duty to pay the tax would be determined
by this decision, was "not attempting to secure an abstract determination by
the court of the validity of a statute, or a decision advising what the law
would be on an uncertain or hypothetical state of facts," but that so long
as its rights arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
are protected by invoking the judicial power to review a judgment of a
State court, a case or controversy is presented, and it is immaterial that no
decree of execution is necessary under the judgment.1
The controversy here was termed "real and substantial," and the court,
thus having jurisdiction, proceeded to a finding against Appellant affirming
judgment below, on the constitutional questions. This is a complete reversal
of opinion by the United States Supreme Court. Although the question of
the validity of declaratory judgments has never before been squarely presented to the court, there have been a number of cases in the past in which
the court used dicta that a declaratory judgment is one which constitutes
an abstract determination as to what the law would be on an uncertain or
5 (Ga.) 144 S. E. 51 (1928).
'Nashville, C.,& St. I, Ry. v. Wallace (Feb. 6, 1933), 53 Sp. Ct. 345.

RECENT CASE NOTES
hypothetical state of facts-in other words that it is a moot question, one
in which no actual rights will be affected.2
Much criticism has been directed at the court since it first suggested
that declaratory judgments did not fall within the Constitution's judicial
clause limiting the jurisdiction of the Constitutional courts to cases or con4
troversies, 3 led principally by Professor Borchard of the Yale Law School.
Justice Stone, who wrote the opinion in the principal case, pointed out in his
5
concurring opinion in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., that the quesnot before the
was
judgments
declaratory
of
constitutionality
the
tion of
court in that case, and that to express any opinion about it was, in effect,
to give a declaratory judgment.
Declaratory judgments have, in fact, been given by the Federal Courts
6
for many years, in cases involving naturalization, the construction of
9
8
7
wills, the quieting of titles, state boundary questions, an action to pass
on an election, and to declare the location of a county seat in territory
(Dakota, in this case),1o a declaration that an award made by the MexicanAmerican Arbitral Tribunal had been obtained by fraud," and suits to determine matrimonial or other status.
The court, in the principal case, does not expressly overrule any of the
cases mentioned; but it must be inferred that its decision has this operative
effect. Justice Stone has adroitly led the other members of the court to
uphold the declaratory judgment. This clearly seems to be true since
Justice Brandeis, who wrote the opinion in the Willing case, did not dissent
here. It would seem safe to say, therefore, that should legislation be
adopted by Congress authorizing the rendering of declaratory judgments in
suits originally begun in Federal courts, the Supreme Court would uphold
it in cases meeting the requirements laid down by the principal case.12
W. T. H.
2 Muskrat v. United States (1911), 219 U. S. 361, 31 Sp. Ct. 250; Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commis. (1921), 258 U. S. 162, 42 Sp. Ct. 261; Fairchild v. Hughes
(1922), 258 U. S. 126, 42 Sp. Ct. 274; Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923), 262 U. S.
447, 43 Sp. CL 597; New Jersey v. Sargent (1926), 269 U. S. 328, 46 Sp. Ct. 122;
Postum Cereal Co., Inc., v. California Fig Nut Co. (1927), 272 U. S. 693, 47 Sp. Ct.
284; Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope (1927), 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sp. Ct. 511;
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn. (1928), 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sp. Ct. 507, and see
(1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 404; Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment in the United
States (1931), 37 W. Va. L. Q. 127; Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory
Judgments (1931), 31 Col. L. Rev. 561.
a Art. III, Section 2 ; for definition of "case" and "controversy", see Muskrat v.
United States (1911), 219 U. S. 361, 31 Sp. Ct. 250.
' See his article cited in note 2, supra, and other articles cited in note 12, Infra.
5 (1928) 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sp. Ct. 507.
9 (1927) Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 46 Sp. Ct. 425.
7
Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.
2 Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sp. Ct. 720.
9Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 Sp. Ct. 408.
20Smith v. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 9 Sp. Ct. 566.
U La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423, 20 Sp. Ct. 168.
22(1928) 3 Cin. L. Rev. 561, address by Professor Borchard before the Cincinnati Lawyers Club, May, 1928; (1928) 3 Ind. L. J. 351; 9 Tex. L. Rev, 172, chiefly
valuable for its citation of all articles on the subject up to and including 1930;
(1931) 6 Ind. L. J. 118, case note, stating kinds of actions in which declaratory
judgments have, in fact, been rendered in the past; Borchard, The Constitutionality
of Declaratory Judgments (1931), 31 Col. L. Rev. 561, probably the best and most
complete article on the subject. Cf. (1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, the only article
arguing against the desirability of the declaratory judgments in Federal courts.

